advancing and were eventually driven back into the sea that evening by Turkish reinforcements.

The early occupation of Chunuk Bair by the Turks compounded Hamilton's problems. This enabled the Turkish forces, although initially outnumbered, to keep the Allies from achieving their objectives. This was especially true for the Anzac forces.

25 April 1915 was the first time Australian and New Zealand forces (which included Maori troops) had ever been in combat. Things were so desperate that British General Sir William Birdwood, the Anzac commander, requested that his forces be withdrawn. In denying the request, Hamilton instructed the Anzacs to hold on to what they had and to "dig, dig, dig." This was exactly what they did, clinging to a small piece of real estate that soon came to be known as "Anzac Cove" and earning for themselves the affectionate nickname of "diggers."

The August Landings

The fighting on the Gallipoli peninsula between 25 April and 6 August resembled the fighting on the Western Front. Despite costly attacks, the Turks could not drive the Allies back into the sea. Despite the stubborn perseverance and tenacity of their attempts, the Allies still had only a toehold at Anzac Cove and at Cape Helles to show for their efforts. Except for a few submarine forays into the Sea of Marmara, the Allied fleet had made no further attempt to force the Dardanelles.

To break the deadlock, Hamilton planned another major operation. The main attack was to be made on 6 August by Anzac forces at Chunuk Bair. An amphibious assault was to be made at Suvla Bay to support the main attack and a holding attack was to be made by the forces at Cape Helles. As in April, amphibious demonstrations were to be made at Bulair and on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. By August Hamilton had been reinforced by six additional divisions, which included a single French division and an Indian brigade. Hamilton now commanded a total of 11 divisions with a total strength of 99,000 men. Five divisions were to make the holding attack at Cape Helles, three divisions were to make the main attack, and two divisions were to make the supporting amphibious assault at Suvla Bay.

Gen von Sanders' forces had also been reinforced, and by August he had 16 divisions totalling about 110,000 men. He had 3 divisions on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, 3 divisions near Bulair, and 10 divisions in the southern part of the Gallipoli peninsula. Of the 10 divisions in the southern part of the peninsula, only 3 faced the Anzac corps. In July, he began to receive intelligence reports that an Allied amphibious operation was imminent. Bulair was still von Sanders' most sensitive point, and as before, he ran the operation from there.

The results of the battle on 6 August were pretty much the same as those on 25 April. The amphibious assault was made with minimal resistance (only three Turkish battalions defended the area). The amphibious forces were in position to outflank the Turkish defenders, but again, timidity and incompetence got in the way. This time fault rested with British Gen Sir Frederick Stopford who failed to follow up his initial success. The amphibious demonstration at Bulair was perhaps even more successful than the earlier landings in April because Turkish reinforcements from the north failed to arrive in the primary battle area until nearly 48 hours later. Since the Allied forces that had landed at Suvla Bay had still not advanced, the Turkish reinforcements arrived in time to ensure that the Allies did not accomplish their objectives. The Turks held Chunuk Bair and were able to foil the Anzac attack. In his memoirs von Sanders admitted that the Allies had overwhelming superiority at Suvla Bay and could have won the day had they not delayed.

Withdrawal

Hamilton was relieved of his command on 15 October 1915, and British Gen Sir Charles Monro was given command because he wanted to withdraw the force. His estimate after his arrival at Gallipoli was that it would take 40,000 casualties to effect a withdrawal. This high estimate caused a stir in London and Kitchener himself visited Gallipoli. The British Admiralty considered having the fleet try again to force the Dardanelles. ADM de Roebuck, however, was against the plan. He was convinced that the fleet could not make it through, and Gen Monro was likewise convinced that Gallipoli was untenable. He therefore received permission to withdraw the forces at Anzac Cove.

It is perhaps ironic that Gen Birdwood, who wanted to withdraw his forces the first night they went ashore, was the one who had the task of withdrawing the first forces from Gallipoli. It is even more ironic because, by then, Birdwood did not want to go. He favored staying on and fighting it out.

In developing his withdrawal plan, Birdwood discarded the idea of withdrawing his entire force at one time. He wanted to deceive the enemy with the appearance of normal operations while secretly withdrawing his forces at night over an extended period of time. Aided by the bitter winter weather, the Anzacs carried out Birdwood's plan. Boats arrived daily with troops visibly crowding the decks to make it appear to the Turks as if the Allies were actually reinforcing Anzac troops. No tents were struck and all the fires were kept lit at night. Normal nighttime artillery firing ceased so the Turks would grow accustomed to the lack of firing. The decision was made to leave large quantities of supplies and material rather than risk compromising the deception by attempting to evacuate it.

By 18 December, only 40,000 Allied troops were left ashore at Anzac Cove. That night 20,000 were taken off. Self-firing guns were rigged to delay the Turks. Landmines, boobytraps, and timed explosives were set everywhere. Even though some of the Anzac positions were only 12 yards away from Turkish lines, on the night of 19 December all of the remaining troops were safely evacuated from Anzac Cove. The only casualties suffered were two wounded. Liman von Sanders did not know of the Anzac withdrawal until 0400 the next morning.

Needless to say, after the successful withdrawal of the Anzac forces, things
did not look good for the remaining Allied forces at Cape Helles. By early January there were 4 Allied divisions at Cape Helles facing a total of 21 Turkish divisions. Mono requested and received permission to withdraw from Cape Helles, but before he could carry out his plan he was reassigned, and Gen Birdwood assumed command.

The withdrawal of forces from Cape Helles went on in much the same manner as the withdrawal from Anzac Cove. By 7 January, there were only 19,000 Allied soldiers left on Gallipoli. That night, von Sanders staged a full-scale attack on the Allied lines. The attack was a disastrous one for the Turks as it was soundly repulsed with only a few Allied casualties. This convinced the Turks that the Allies were not leaving Cape Helles any time soon. Yet on the next night all remaining troops were evacuated from Cape Helles with no casualties whatsoever.

Summary
Churchill lost his cabinet position because of the Gallipoli failure. Many said he never should have attempted to force the Dardanelles without the support of ground forces. It can also be said that, but for the timidity of de Roebuck, the fleet would have successfully forced its way into the Sea of Marmara. Even if it had, however, there was no guarantee the fleet could have kept the Dardanelles open for follow-on support shipping, nor was there any guarantee that Hamilton's forces could have taken Constantinople. Much of Churchill's plan was political rather than military and involved a large risk. It hinged upon the shock value of a fleet of battleships appearing just off Constantinople to topple the unstable Turkish Government. Any setback the British received would in all likelihood have the opposite effect; the Turkish Government would be strengthened. The Gallipoli campaign may have been lost, then, when the three battleships were sunk in the Dardanelles.

Hamilton's plan for the initial landing made good use of the amphibious raid and amphibious demonstration to gain numerical superiority at the point of attack. He was able to do this by land-}

ing where his enemy didn't expect him and conducting his demonstration where his enemy was most vulnerable. Were it not for the success of the raids and demonstrations, the Allies would not have gained a foothold given the Turkish capability for rapid reinforcement. But as things turned out, reinforcements were delayed, and the Allies might have seized the entire southern peninsula of Gallipoli had the Anzac forces recognized that Chunuk Bair was the dominant terrain feature and if the forces that landed at Y Beach rolled up the flank of the Turkish defenders. Since neither of these events occurred, the Allies were able to gain only a foothold.

The trench warfare that occurred between April and August reveals that the military technology of the time strongly favored the defense over the offense. Neither side could gain an advantage. It is to Hamilton's credit that, even during this impasse, he realized the value of the amphibious assault to regain the offensive momentum.

The amphibious demonstrations during the August landings were more effective in delaying Turkish reinforcements than in the initial landings. This time Chunuk Bair was the objective, and the amphibious assault was practically unopposed on the enemy's exposed flank. Gen Stopford, however, failed to exploit this tactical advantage. Stopford's inexperience, however, should not cause us to overlook the effectiveness of the amphibious operations. Stopford threw away a golden opportunity, but the only reason the Allies had such an opportunity was the result of an amphibious assault into the Turkish flank and the amphibious demonstrations.

Although Gen Birdwood wanted to stay and fight, he and his staff developed an amphibious withdrawal plan keyed on deception. It was a well-conceived and well-executed plan that would do equally well at both Cape Helles and Anzac Cove. There was no loss of life and no one was left behind. The successful withdrawal kept the Gallipoli campaign from becoming a much greater tragedy than it was.

The Gallipoli campaign was the largest amphibious venture ever conducted up to that time. Despite its overall fail-